Monday, December 06, 2004

Essay on secularisms

Materialism through Equivocation

Tibor R. Machan

Within the secular philosophical community there is more division than
meets the eye. Critics of Secular Humanism, mainly from theological and
religious circles, tend to overlook thisÂ?they think that all those who
reject the supernatural realm are therefore materialists. This way they
can intimate that without embracing the supernatural, we consign ourselves
to the status of bits of matter floating about aimlesslyÂ?without
consciousness and, more importantly, without moral conscienceÂ?in the
universe (unless we drastically redefine these notions).

But some justification exists for how Secular Humanists are treated by
these critics. Quite a few secular thinkers do embrace the materialist
alternative. Their false choice is that between materialism and
spiritualism, where the former amounts to affirming only nature-as-pure
matter as real, the latter embracing something spooky and ineffable,
namely, the ghostly supernatural.

But there are other alternatives that many philosophers who have rejected
supernaturalism or spiritualism affirm without hesitation. These thinkers
are also naturalists, holding that there nothing besides what is part of
nature exists. They do not believe that any scientific laws can be escaped
in this natural realm, nor the laws of a metaphysics, limited to the basic
ones, such as the Law of Identity, the Law of Non-Contradiction, the Law
of the Excluded Middle, and the Law of Causality.

Yet what separates these secular thinkers from the materialists is that
they agree that many types of beings can exists in the world, not just
bits of matter (whatever that is supposed to be anyway). As a result, of
course, they also hold that there can be different kinds of causes in
reality, depending on the nature of what is involved in a causal
relationship. Sure, billiard balls on a pool table and a whole lot else
thatÂ?s part of reality will exhibit the Law of Causality in a mechanistic
fashion. On the subatomic level, however, this same law will be exhibited
in the fashion spelled out by quantum mechanics; while at the level of
human consciousness the Law of Causality will be manifest as self- or
agent causation or free will. And others versions may well exist, too,
with scientists looking into the matter all the time.

My point here isnÂ?t to show that these different forms of causation
existÂ?it is, at any rate, pretty evident to most of us that they do.
ThatÂ?s because human beings also have the unique capacity to know of their
own causal power Â?from inside.Â? They are able to experience it as it
exists within them when they act (and how this differs from when they are,
say, pushed about by forces over which they have no control, such as the
wind or a virus). Ed Pols, in his The Acts of Our Being (1982), shows this
brilliantly. The point is to make it clear that not all naturalisms are
alike. AristotleÂ?s is different from HobbesÂ?s, SpinozaÂ?s from MarxÂ?s, and
NewtonÂ?s (when he wasnÂ?t dabbling in supernaturalism and the occult) isnÂ?t
that of EinsteinÂ?s.

In short, not all naturalists are reductive materialists. Whether they
are correct is, of course, another matter. But to know that the
alternatives are more varied than both some of the critics and some of the
defenders of the secular stance make it appear is important. At least for
PR purposes! Why?

Because common sense tells many people that they have free will and there
are moral responsibilities they need to fulfill. They have a well enough
grasp that they could well neglect these (which is when they may be said
to be acting irresponsibly and can be blamed for this), or fulfill them in
exemplary fashion (which is when they deserve praise). When secular
thinkers deny this, along with denying some alleged supernatural
dimension, they easily alienate ordinary folks from secularism. Few will
go along at the price they think they have to pay, namely, to abandon
their common sense, what essentially gets them through their lives with a
good deal of success. So they remain linked to supernaturalism where they
think free will and morality has to be located.

But if they are aware that embracing secular ideas does not need to mean
giving up on their common sense beliefs in free will and moral
responsibility, they could well give the secular option more attention.
And they indeed should.



Tibor in Good Mood! Posted by Hello

Column on Crimes vs. "Crimes"

Perils of Meddlesome Public Policy

Tibor R. Machan

A clear case is drug enforcement. Since much of drug trade and use is
carried out in private, within the borders of someoneÂ?s own property, the
only way to detect this stuff is by invading privacy in the myriad ways
that can be done in todayÂ?s high tech culture.

The laws against drug use, as many other laws pertaining to victimless
Â?crimes,Â? plainly encourage law enforcement that is in blatant violation
of justice, of due process. That is to say, it violates the provision of
justice that requires that laws be enforced without violating individual
rights. A good constitution spells out those rights and the American
document does a creditable job of stating some of these.

When police officers must enforce laws that require violating such
rights, we witness the systematic debasement of the legal order we live
under. What is not fully appreciated is that this is nearly impossible to
avoid when there are so many laws regulating private conduct. Take a law
against sodomy, for example, or against hiring illegal aliens. To find out
that these laws are being violated is very difficult without breaking all
kinds of principles of justice.

The reason is that such victimless crimes involve mostly willing
participants. These laws, in other words, pertain to acts between
consenting adults. So they have no complainants, no one who is actually
hurt when the crime is committed. But then how is one to tell where itÂ?s
being committed, who is committing it, etc.?

The answer is you need to gain entrance to locations and the
Â?cooperationÂ? of witnesses, by intimidation, threats, spying, snooping,
breaking and entering and so forth. No way can the enforcement of such
crimes remain on the up and up.

One beauty of the free society is that when laws are being violated, it
must involve someone who is wronged. Rights violation wrongs people, even
if they might benefit from it in limited ways (say by writing a best
selling book after being assaulted or robbed). Limiting law enforcement to
laws that are truly in the business of Â?securing rightsÂ? makes it possible
to be guided by due process and achieve the objective sought.

But when the law, public policy or regulation gets involved in
regimenting how people should conduct themselves irrespective of whether
they violate or threaten to violate peopleÂ?s rights, then the standards of
police work get utterly confused. In the very act of doing oneÂ?s job as a
police officer, one is violating peopleÂ?s rights, which deprives the
entire system of moral standing. It also attracts the worst kind of police
officers, the bullies, those who love to harass people whose choices they
simply do not like, never mind whether they have done someone any wrong.

The situation is perilous for justice because it is very difficult to
extricate a legal system from these corruptions. For all the malpractices
there tend to arise vested interest groups. Unlike with the Draconian
tyrannies where once found out, there is sufficient resolve not to fall
pretty to pleas of special privilegeÂ?e.g., Nazi concentration camps did
not remain active because the guards had strong unions and lobbyistsÂ?with
the sort of malpractices involved in the meddlesome welfare state this
isnÂ?t so. Instead a tug of war ensues, with all parties insisting that
their meddlesomeness is vital to the quality of the society. (Just think
of all those righteous advocates of the war on drugs!)

My only hope here is education. In time enough folks could acknowledge
the superior value of respect for rights, even to trump their special
projects. Then, maybe, the system will get cleaned up. But until then
those in society who understand the gross injustices that are perpetrated
by the system must keep at it, even if immediate progress is unlikely.

Today a sheriffÂ?s organization called me to contribute to some retirement
program or something. I kept the guy on the phone long enough to give him
a lesson or two about what is involved in enforcing vicious laws. Who
knows, it might have taken.


Column on diversity

The Ideal of Meaningless Diversity

Tibor R. Machan

New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd isnÂ?t happy. When that occurs, we,
who follow the venerable publication, will know it. The home of her
columns are the envy of many who sound off on the events of our time.

On this occasion she was complaining about how Tom Brokaw of NBC TVÂ?s
Nightly News will not be replaced by someone black or by a woman but,
instead, by another white male. As she puts it, Â?Those guys are hard to
kill off. Indeed, white men are ascendant in Red State America.Â? She
quotes Brokaw himself opining on this: Â?I honestly thought, eight or nine
years ago, that when we [Peter Jennings, Dan Rather] left," she quotes
Brokaw, Â?that it would be the end of white male anchor time."

OK, so perhaps she didnÂ?t really mean literally Â?kill offÂ?, although with
her characteristic venom whenever her own will is thwarted, you cannot
tell for sure. On the occasion of her ill chosen words, however, we may
take a pause and consider just what this racial and sexual diversity stuff
is all about. Certainly, it follows nicely the intentions of many, many
people at university campuses across the country. As a member of several
panel discussions at those where I have taught and am still teaching, I
get this a lot: Â?But you are a white male and this shows we lack diversity
on this campus, what with those other white guys sitting there next to
you.Â?

Just exactly why is it so important to construe diversity in terms of
color and sex, even national or ethnic background? Surely it is rank
prejudice to believe that because someone is black or a woman or hails
from China, certain views will emanate from that personÂ?s lips. The depth
of diversity involved in mixing it by such criteria is ridiculously
shallow. So, OK, we will see blacks and women but for all we may usually
anticipate, the views we will get are the same across the board. The
really important diversity, namely of viewpoints, is completely unrelated
to whether on is a woman, a man, 50 or 23 years old, from Europe or
Africa, rich or poor.

Unless, of course, color, race, sex, location and such make someone think
a certain way. But that would be a racist, sexists, ageists or whatever
thought. And then, naturally, the very policy of diversity would be tied
to whether one is of a certain race, sex, national or ethnic origin. And
that would render it immune to criticism.

Ms. Dowd probably doesnÂ?t even fathom this, but her demand for other than
a white male at the helm of NBC TV Nightly News is, actually, racist. As
if picking a black would make the news come off differently. As if putting
people of a certain color, race, sex or national/ethnic background on the
airÂ?or, for that matter, on a panel of scholarsÂ?amounted to providing a
diversity of viewpoints.

If that were the case, racism and such must be viewed as very
naturalÂ?those who are white males can be counted on, reasonably, to make
certain choices in hiring, irrespective of competence, qualifications,
skill, and the like. Blacks will then be guaranteed by their color to
think in certain ways, as will whites, women, those from Russia or
Afghanistan. And Maureen Dowd will, of course, spout forth as she does
because, well, she has to, regardless of judgment, reflection, evidence,
argumentÂ?that is to say, regardless of the qualify of her thinking about
these matters. ItÂ?s simply all set, by race, sex, ethnicity.

Such Â?identity politicsÂ? is the death of true diversity, of the variety
of thinking that ought to be hosted at universities and other centers of
debate, including in the news media. What good does it do to mix it up on
the basis of such irrelevant criteria anyway when it has nothing to do, as
it surely does not, with how someone thinks?

At a recent event at my university, following the viewing of Michael
MooreÂ?s Fahrenheit 9/11, a few professors, including me, mixed it up about
the merits or lack thereof of this cinematographic jewel. None of us
looked all that different from one another but, by Jove, we all thought
quite differently. After I spoke a few words in the midst of it all, a
young black woman stood up to say that if someone is white, he or she will
never be able to know just what blacks have been experiencing in the way
of prejudice and oppression. I quickly replied that that is a hopelessly
defeatist view: it would mean that understanding across the races is
impossible. (Never mind that it assumes that no whites have ever
experienced prejudice and oppression!)

Very tellingly after the event was over, three black students came up to
me thanking me for my comments, saying they appreciated how I acknowledge
that what counts is not oneÂ?s color, race or similar relatively
superficial attributes but the qualify of oneÂ?s mind and the merits of
oneÂ?s thinking. Just so.


Recommendation

Sideways is hilarious, even if neither of the main characters is to be
emulated at all. The story line isn't bad, though--especially the stuff on
getting published. But it is the scenery, which is simply stunning,
conveying an ambiance via the California Central Coast's wine country
that's hard to beat--I'd say it matches Tuscany, where I have done a bit
of traveling, without much trouble. It occurred to me that here is for
once Hollywood having no trouble making bourgeois life look pretty good!

Tibor

Column on Law & Order


The Corruption of Law & Order

Tibor R. Machan

No, this time I am only indirectly speaking about the terrible legal
system that the USA is now sliding toward. Instead, it is the TV show, Law
& Order, that comes up for discussion. But, once again, it is for its slow
corruption.

When the show began there was a healthy idealism about it. The initial
story lines stressed principles not only of law but of justice. Michael
MoriarityÂ?s Assistant DA was motivated from conviction and the ideas and
ideals that guided him were mostly truly valuable.

In time others came to the show, left it, and Sam Waterson, while very
competent and often dealing with very significant issuesÂ?such as
individual responsibility versus excuses for how one behavesÂ?isnÂ?t given
as many occasions for soaring as was his predecessor on the show. Much of
the show now is torturously PC.

Perhaps the most disturbing element of the programÂ?for not always dealing
with monumental themes is not something for which a TV program ought to be
chidedÂ?is how the most recent addition to the characters, one who replaces
Lenny, that of Dennis Ferina, has brought some really objectionable traits
to the way the police are depicted. Or, are the writers perhaps aiming to
be more realistic?

FerinaÂ?s character is given the role of bullying. A night club owner is
nearly coerced into giving him help by using the threat of closing down
his establishment for trivial violations of some kind of city regulations.
This approach to gathering information, which really indicts the
detectives for lacking the skill to proceed within the guidelines of due
process, is not OK at all. It is vicious, a form of police malpractice,
yet the show makes no mention of that fact, no one is called on the carpet
to answer for such conduct. By omission, then, Law & Order is now
endorsing injustice, somewhat akin to how those giving lip service to law
and order in the USA are often doing gross violence to justice, to
individual rights.

As Thomas Aquinas said, Â?A man is said to be just because he respects the
rights (jus) of others.Â? While mere authority shouldnÂ?t count for much,
Aquinas had it right, just as did the American Founders: Political and
legal justice is when the peopleÂ?s rights are respected as they are being
protected. Which means due process.

So many people in our country and elsewhere bellyache about the bad
influence of Hollywood and other producers of entertainment, mainly
because of sex and violence. Well, few would point to Law & Order, the TV
show, but I will. Just as it was with Miami Vice, so it is beginning to be
with Law & Order. The cops canÂ?t do anything wrong.

This is sad. I have myself been a member of the police in my life, an Air
Policeman, and I find it especially annoying to have one of the most
poplar TV shows in the country sanction methods of dealing with the public
they are supposed to serve that are obviously wrong. I and most of my
colleagues struggled hard never to step over the line, never to
intimidate, threaten anyone who hasnÂ?t be shown to be guilty of anything.
It is disturbing that a popular and widely respected TV program would so
betray the profession of the peace officer.

Again, let me make clear: I do not expect drama of Shakespearian caliber
on a TV series. So if Law & Order isnÂ?t any longer its original
exceptional self, such is life. Writers can run out of elevating material.

But itÂ?s another thing entirely to begin to slack off on essentials. And
of police work it is most essential that due process be strictly adhered
to, including in how the profession is depicted when made a vehicle of
entertainment. Talk about promoting perverse moral values!

Alas, it goes to show, once again, that people are often able to fail as
well as succeed. However, when it is not noted clearly and explicitly that
such is our lot, there is even greater danger of malfeasance. The very
corruption of a profession is recklessly glorified on TV.



Column on Bad vs. Evil

Why Bad isnÂ?t the Same as Evil

Tibor R. Machan

Because so much of the substance of ethics is linked to religion, and
because religion is a troublesome seat of truth for those who trade in
evidence and argument, ethics (or morality) has itself gotten the back of
the hand of the modern, erudite intellectual. Instead of talk of evil,
which such people tend to demean as superstitious or confused, modern
thinkers acknowledge only the existence of bad things, mistakes, or
mishaps.

Bad things, of course, are hardly deniable. An earthquake that kills
thousands is bad. A virus or a hurricane would also be. But all these are
generally thought of as distinct from evil deeds, which are the bad things
people do that they might and ought not have done. Evil assume that those
who do it have a choice. They could refrain from doing the deed and indeed
ought to. Evil is something only an agent with free will can produce.

In the last 400 years or so there emerged a view of the world that has
basically eliminated morality because the idea is that everything that
happens has to happen. There is no choice in the universe, nothing that
can be produced by something with a free will. A free will is taken to be
something spooky, mysterious, miraculous and thus the province of faith,
not of science, reason, evidence or argument. As a result, evil is dead.

What has come to replace evil is, of course, bad stuff. Murder, rape,
lying, cheating, laziness, betrayal, cowardliness, and such are all
afflictions. People are victims of such behavior or suffer such conditions
but are never responsible for them. And their decency, heroism, or other
worthy achievements are also simply accidental, not something for which
they can rightfully take credit. The most prominent of ethical and
political writers today embrace this outlook.

Of course there isnÂ?t full consistency about any of this. There are
plenty of intellectuals, philosophers, even psychologists willing to
deploy ethical or moral language, but very selectively. Racism is still
evil, so is bigotry or unfairness, especially when it comes to promoting
it in the economic sphere. And EnronÂ?s ex-chiefs are still evil!

But when push comes to shove, this is pretty forced nowadays. The basic
theories that rule, from particle physics to cosmology, tilt firmly
against the idea that human beings are free agents and are responsible for
what they do.

Not that all those who are complicit in dispensing with ethics will
bite the bullet. Some doÂ?there are books arguing unapologetically against
morality by people who embrace the fully determinist outlook (just take a
look at Ted HonderichÂ?s little volume, How Free Are You? [Oxford
University Press, 2002])Â?but some want to have it both ways and try to
make determinism compatible with free will (for instance, Daniel Dennett
in his Elbow Room, The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having [MIT Press,
1984]). But the latter mean something different by ethics from what most
of us do: they have in mind that bad behavior exists and that yes there
are means of coping with such behavior, like punishment, blame and so
forth. Yet, they deny that the behavior could have been otherwise, except
if certain impersonal forces had prevented it.

So, for example, a murderer is responsible for the murder in the sense
that it was he or she who engaged in the behavior that produced the
homicide. But only if there had been some factors to intervene would the
behavior have been avoided. Choice didnÂ?t have a role at allÂ?or if it did,
then the choice itself had to be caused by certain factors.

In short, the same person in the identical circumstances could not have
done otherwise. Which is to say, free will does not exist by this view.

Well, this is a problem and I am not going to presume to deal with it all
here. Suffice it to observe only that what underlies it is an impoverished
view of what is possible in the world. The determinists think there can
only be one kind of cause, namely, the sort we witness in mechanicsÂ?say on
the pool table when one ball causes another to move. But there could well
be other types of causesÂ?for instance, when Mozart creates music or
Rembrandt paints or indeed a philosophers produces a defense of
determinism.


Column on Medical v. Non-Med Marijuana Use

Marijuana UseÂ?Medical vs. non-Medical

Tibor R. Machan

The late 60s and early 70s were my graduate school days, at U. C. Santa
Barbara, and there was then plenty of pot smoking going on. Some of it was
reckless, just as alcohol consumption or gambling or other peaceful
conduct can be quite reckless, but most of it was merely a bit
mind-numbing and consciousness-altering. Yes, many, many young people got
high yet few if any suffered greatly, certainly not by moving on to hard
drugs. At least no more so than the number of moderate wine consumers move
on to become alcoholics.

But while the United States of America was parading itself as the leader
of the free world during that Cold War era, it was mostly the champions of
patriotism and loyalty to the flag who insisted on making pot consumption
a crime. Their persistence led to the abomination we know as Â?the war on
drugs,Â? an immensely costly and vicious undertaking by government to
punish people engaged in the trade and consumption of a substance that
does not cause anyone to do anything criminal (even if it does lead some
people to become lethargic and temporarily confused). The policy also
resulted in making the USA a massive home to prisoners who have violated
no oneÂ?s rights at all.


>Nothing above even suggests that consuming pot is
OK. It is very risky to any users and as such extreme caution needs to be
exercised with it, just as with alcohol. Indeed, abstinence is probably
best, for most of us.

Yet here was a place where a dominant element of American culture turned
directly against the political principles on which the country was
founded. We all, individually, have the unalienable right to our lives,
liberty and pursuit of happiness, or so the Founders stated because they
learned it from people like John Locke, the English political philosopher,
and from their knowledge of the history of human community life. That
history showed them that government is to be the hired servant of people,
not their rulerÂ?ergo, the importance of asserting those rights. Sadly,
conservatives, who pride themselves on wanting to retain the principles on
which their communities are founded, completely jettisoned their
commitment to honor this countryÂ?s most important tradition and switched,
instead, to embracing the statist conservatism of Europe and the rest of
the world.

Of course, it is a problem of conservatism which of several competing
traditions to embrace, so the switch was not all that surprisingÂ?just look
at President Bush and his reversal of Ronald ReaganÂ?s efforts to cut back
the scope and size of government, all the while claiming to be a
conservative. The price of the witch, however, is staggering. Thousands of
lives have been ruined because these conservativesÂ?and by now even
othersÂ?take it upon themselves to disregard the unalienable rights of
individuals and impose their will on the rest of us.

At this time there is a little bit of an opening out of the morass of
this shameful tyranny in our Â?freeÂ? society. The US Supreme Court will
decide whether at least some people, those who are likely to gain health
benefits from consuming marijuana, will have their right to liberty
protected. If they judge in favor, they will uphold another conservative
ideal, namely, stateÂ?s rights, something that used to be partisan but now
is embraced not just by advocates of medical marijuana use but many
environmentalists. And they will also exempt a few folks from the tyranny
of the war on drugs.

Yet, sadly, they will also affirm a disgraceful policy of discrimination
by treating those who have a certain use for pot, leaving others with a
different but equally peaceful use as criminals if they persist.

The real answer is the abolition of prohibitionÂ?just as it was, once
again, with alcohol.


Friday, October 22, 2004

One of My Pet Peeves

Tibor R. Machan

It’s when promises go unfulfilled, that’s certainly one. The other day I had a guest speaker to our college whom I promised a certain sum from a budget set up for just this purpose. I had put in the request for the money two weeks before the event but when it rolled around there was still no check. So I implored those in charge of the matter to please issue the check and was told it would be around the day after the event. OK, so I arranged to have it sent to the speaker only it didn’t show up that day either.

Then our speaker happened to be coming to campus to do an interview with someone and so I called the bursar’s office and asked whether we could get the check over to our offices so he could pick it up after he did the interview. I was told it would be ready at 1:30 PM, about an hour later. At this point I made my dismay quite evident and insisted that they get the check to our offices by noon, no later. And so it happened but not without a fuss.

Now this is one reason some folks consider me a pain—or, to quote a former dean of mine at Auburn University, “difficult.” I am difficult if that means I speak up when promises made to me aren’t kept.

Recently I had a proposal in to a well known organization with which I had been doing business since 1976; I had done umpteen events for them and attended many more and I was hoping they would accept this proposal on a very important philosophical topic.

I first broached the issue with them about 4 years ago and after a lot of back and forth got a promise that they would be back with an answer by early 2004. I waited and waited and then I called and was told some story about why I need to wait again and then silence sat in. After a few months went by I finally called and was again stone walled by some big shots and at that point I just had had it. I told them off.

Treating people who come through regularly with prompt and very satisfying work with such lack of consideration, with failure to make good on promises to them, is not something anyone ought to simply tolerate. Sure, often there is nothing one can do about it apart from making one’s position clear and eventually simply stopping to deal with such folks. And on several occasions I have done just that, hence the “difficult” label. (In one recent instance when I spoke up about the disrespect such treatment shows one, I was characterized as “paranoid” by one of the people who had been complicit in the dilly-dallying.)

All this is rather baffling to me. Maybe I am naïve but I do not think so, for holding that when promises are made, they ought to be kept. Oh, there is that cultural thing some folks invoke, as when they claim that in Italy, of course, one cannot expect punctuality or in Hungary enthusiastically made plans will be forgotten in no time. But even that seems to me to be bunk—the Italians and Hungarians who indulge themselves thus ought to shape up, that’s the answer.

This summer a travel agency—that took my very early pre-payment for a cruise my daughters and I were going to take—suddenly, about 10 days or so before the cruise was to commence, cancelled it all without any explanation. We had made elaborate preparations—the cruise was to sail from London to St. Petersburg, Russia and back—and the cancellation meant the non-refundable airline tickets would be lost, not to mention the nearly $5k for the cruise itself and the fee to an airline for some flight changes. OK, but then I was promised, via a fax and an email, that all would be refunded by August 20, 2004, not to worry.

Well, folks, it is now nearly November and but a 3rd of what we were owed had been paid back and each time I inquire I get a song and dance about how I am making things worse by asking! I just do not get it. So my answer is to keep after them.

I am often a severe critic of government regulations and have even threatened to write a book titled “Be Your Own Ralph Nader,” to argue that it is best to rely on one’s own savvy to rectify the “market failures” we encounter, not to beg for government intervention. And I haven’t changed my views on that. It does occur to me, however, that perhaps some folks have personalities that simply aren’t fit to cope with the varieties of bad behavior one encounters in the market place. It takes a lot out of me, for example, to keep after these folks who breach their promises but I am sort of prepped for it, having had to fight my way throughout most of my life since I left my country of birth and needed to hone special skills for getting on. My own kids often find themselves stymied because they aren’t all that fond of struggling against the dilly-dalliers they find as they grow up and need to cope with logistics more and more. Although, they have learned a trick or two from their Papa!

I have no big answers here, only a warning. If you insist that folks behave as they ought to, if you refuse to be a sap, you will often annoy them. And so perhaps prudence needs to accompany the courage to stand up for what you know is right.

Saturday, October 16, 2004

From Tom Palmer:
Good notes. I may have put the point too strongly. (I'll have to listento it again to be sure.) I think that I did emphasize that the American founders radicalized and purified the ideas, making them more consistent. But I don't think that they were original in their basic ideas aboutindividual liberty per se (although the constitutional scheme that Madison and others set out could be said to be a more radical innovation); they drew on a long tradition, to which they made frequent reference. Few of the founders would have given women any political role, although most were pretty hostile to slavery, but the abstract formulation of thelanguage of the Declaration and the Constitution certainly lent themselves to consistent application to recognition of the equal rights of women and of black people. (By the way, the piece you heard was less than half ofthe lecture that I gave; it just stopped around Magna Charta or somewheresimilar, which was a bit odd.)

Tom Palmer
Hi, Tom [Palmer]:
In your talk about liberty on the CD Cato sent out this month [October, 2004] you take some pleasure in ridiculing those who think liberty is a recent development in human history. Having heard you speak many many times and having never been a progressivist myself has put me on guard about this for a long time. Yet, I do believe that the Declaration of Independence had been a revolutionary political document, not because it invented liberty but because never before had the idea--which admittedly had lurked about for centuries--been incorporated into a full fledged political creed. That's probably because, as Stanley Cavell has put it, America was made by the Founders--it isn't something that slowly evolved. So there was a chance here to give expression, officially, to these heretical ideas and ideals. While the notions involved had percolated for centuries--starting probably with Lao Tzu and Alcibiades (as I chronicle in The Virtue of Liberty [FEE, 1994])--understandably it never got a good rap from leaders of countries. (Why should it have--it would have meant pretty much disenfranchising them!)
Also, some things needed to be known that had not been in order to gain full confidence in such notions that slavery sucks and women ought to have a place among the citizenry, as men do. I do not believe one needs to have a Whig notion of history to accept that even in ethics and politics there can be some advances made, never guaranteed. After all, while not exactly like medicine, ethics and politics do gain from greater understanding of, say, the merits of the division of labor or public choice theory.
Best,
Tibor

Sunday, October 10, 2004

From Jeffrey Friedman (10-10-04)

I looked forward with great interest to Tibor's response to Bruce Ramsey's account of a recent Critical Review Foundation seminar. But instead, he refers to a 1997 article I wrote in Critical Review, and gets what I said there completely wrong.

In that article (see criticalreview.com --> back issues --> vol. 11, no. 3), I criticized extant rationales for libertarianism that fail to draw on our knowledge of the empirical world (non-consequentialist rationales, roughly speaking), as well as consequentialist economic rationales for libertarianism. Then I proposed a new consequentialist rationale for libertarianism, drawn from our knowledge of mass democratic politics (but not the public-choice rationale).

Machan, apparently assuming that the only things anyone can say about libertarianism must be things he has already rebutted, thinks that I must be arguing that "each instance of proposed coercion" must be proved undesirable, "over and over again." Wrong.

What I wrote in 1997, and what I teach in the seminar on which Ramsey reports, concerns what, if anything, makes infringements on capitalism coercive; and what makes coercion bad. To oversimplify, what's at issue is whether non-consequentialist rationales for libertarianism make sense—not whether consequentialist rationales should assess the consequences of individual acts, or of general rules, or of overarching economic systems.

Perhaps some day Tibor will choose to debate (or even agree with) what I have actually written or said, rather than with what he imagines the only conceivable positions at odds with his own must be.

Jeffrey Friedman
Editor, Critical Review (www.criticalreview.com)
Publisher, The Dissident (http://www.the-dissident.com/)

From Tibor Machan (10-10-04):
Here is what I actually wrote involving Jeffrey Friedman, just in case his own reply has, as I think it has, confused the issue: "A dispute among those who favor the free society concerns whether the merits of that society need to be demonstrated over and over again, in each instance of proposed coercion. I believe this is the main thrust of an essay by Jeffrey Friedman, editor of Critical Review, published in that same journal back in 1997, titled, "What's Wrong with Libertarianism," Critical Review 11, no. 3 (1997). (See, for a recent discussion of Friedman's challenge, by Bruce Ramsay’s essay at http://www.vonmises.org/fullstory.aspx?Id=1626.)"
Friedman never responds to this, and why should he? What I believe doesn't appear to interest him. But what I wrote is, in fact, the main thrust of all those who denounce libertarians who consider well defended moral and political principles a sound basis on which to oppose various private actions and public policies. Indeed, the entire matter of dickering about what coercion is, what amounts to initiating force, is not the issue--certainly there can be question about whether one or another interaction with others amounts to coercion, just as there can be dispute about whether a case of sexual intercourse amounts to rape or seduction or something else. But I have never found Friedman and those who join him actually state, unequivocally, that they oppose the use of coercion by some people against others. No, they wish to debate whether coercion itself may or may not be effective public policy. As Friedman puts his most general point (associated with his reading of several books on the topic), "libertarians do not yet possess an adequate critique of government interference in the market economy--a critique, that is to say, that establishes not only why the state should be kept on a very short leash, but why it should be emasculated." Friedman then sets out to see whether libertarians have shown that two supposedly incompatible attributes of statism have been established, namely, "harmful empirical effects" of state interference, and the "allegedly intrinsic evil of state regulation or redistribution."
Many have responded to Friedman's paper but Friedman keeps insisting no one has rebutted his points successfully. And perhaps he is correct, but not because no libertarian has managed to show that state coercion has harmful effects (the "empirical" is a pointless qualifier--harmful effects are harmful effects, and what "empirical" adds to this is anybody's guess; perhaps he means material effects, like run down housing produced by urban renewal, which was demonstrated several decades ago by, for example, Martin Anderson in The Federal bulldozer; a critical analysis of urban renewal, 1949-1962 [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press,1964], a work he ignores) but because there is nothing to indicate what would count for Friedman as a demonstration of any such thing. He leaves it entirely indeterminate what criterion is to count as having shown what he wants to have shown.
This is also the case with the second attribute of the state he asks libertarians to demonstrate, namely, the "intrinsic evil of state regulation or redistribution." Those libertarians who argue on the basis of the natural rights of individuals to their lives, etc., or some other principle such as "equal liberty," rarely if ever uphold some intrincisist view of the evil of state regulation or redistribution but they do maintain that forcibly mandating some conduct or extorting the wealth of others, whether it be done by the state or by some criminal or criminal gang such as the Mafia, is morally and should be legally wrong.
Many, many libertarians have advanced somewhat different cases for this but Friedman takes no notice of a great many of them so his dismissal of them all--"libertarians do not yet possess" refers to all libertarians, with no qualification such as "the bulk of them," "some of them," "the most prominent of them" or the like--is plainly unjustified. By 1991, when Friedman's paper appeared, several Herculean efforts have been placed on record regarding whether "state regulation or redistribution" is morally and political wrong, unjustified, a violation of principles of justice (that is, individual rights). (See, M. Bruce Johnson & Tibor R. Machan, eds., Rights and Regulation [1983], for just one example of a rich collection of papers addressing some of these matters. My own contributions are numerous but at that time Individuals and Their Rights [1989] advanced a sustained critique of, among other coercive policies, wealth redistribution; a chapter, "The Non-Existence of Welfare Rights," from this work has been repeatedly reprinted in collections of essays on social and political philosophy, testifying to the fact that at least some folks had deemed the points raised there by one libertarian worthy of discussion. Essays by other libertarians, such as Eric Mack, have also made the rounds in this kind of literature, yet Friedman appears to find them all worthless.)
So if there is someone who hasn't met the requirement of demonstrating his points, Friedman is the prime candidate. Moreover, his practice of recasting the views of those whom he lambastes--for "criticizing" is too generous a term when people aren't quoted and some of the main contributors to the discussion aren't even mentioned--makes it very difficult to take up what he puts forth, since in too many cases--for example, his talk of "intrinsic evil"--none fit the characterization he advances.
It is my understanding that when one discusses people with whom one disagrees, one ought to try very conscientiously to lay out their position in their own terms and deal with them accordingly. This Friedman hasn't done. So when he states now that "What I wrote in 1997, and what I teach in the seminar on which Ramsey reports, concerns what, if anything, makes infringements on capitalism coercive; and what makes coercion bad," appears to me confused. What makes "infringements" "coercive"? Well, if they really are infringements--say, taking someone's property in a phony eminent domain scam so the government can collect more taxes than otherwise by leasing it to Costco (see, as an example of more on this, Steven Greenhut, Abuse of Power [2004])--then they are coercive in as much as "coercive" means "violation of someone's basic rights" (in this instance to private property). What makes coercion bad? What makes rape bad? What makes assault bad? What makes robbery bad? Surely Friedman must know that many libertarians have answered these questions and to declare that none has produced "an adequate critique" is groundless, given his skimpy examination of libertarian arguments. In effect, Friedman needs an impossibility proof--showing that no libertarian can possibly produce "an adequate critique"--to sustain his claim and he has produced nothing remotely close to that.
So, perhaps we can now carry on with the work that matters, namely, developing some of the nuances and detailed legal implications of the several very promising libertarian arguments that have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that those who are identified as "the state" are embarking on harmful policies and are being unjust as they are doing infringing coercively on capitalism--that is to say, on human beings going about the innumerable facets of the peaceful task of production and trade.



Coercion, a bad thing all around?

By Tibor R. Machan

A dispute among those who favor the free society concerns whether the merits of that society need to be demonstrated over and over again, in each instance of proposed coercion. I believe this is the main thrust of an essay by Jeffrey Friedman, editor of Critical Review, published in that same journal back in 1997, titled, "What's Wrong with Libertarianism," Critical Review 11, no. 3 (1997). (See, for a recent discussion of Friedman's challenge, by Bruce Ramsay’s essay at http://www.vonmises.org/fullstory.aspx?Id=1626.)
In my view this requirement is akin to having to demonstrate on each occasion of assault or rape that it is wrong and shouldn’t have occurred, rather than taking it as a general truth that such conduct should not occur. Something comparable happens when people want it shown, over and over again, that clairvoyance or alchemy do not work, instead of recognizing that these are generally futile endeavors. Or, when people report ghost sightings, do we need, on each occasion need, to check to make sure that these are mistaken?
But, of course, hope springs eternal in the human heart, so perhaps it is no wonder that each time it is demonstrated that coercive public policies are wrong — that they lead to misery — there will be many who will insist that they be tried again, and only once another fails again will they agree to its inadvisability — but only for that instance. So then they will urge it on us again.
The dispute is really about whether certain general principles of human social organization can be known to be true or must their inadvisability be reestablished each time they are proposed. Those who argue for the latter, for repeated demonstrations, are skeptics about general truths.
Actually they aren’t usually consistent because they will accept general truths in physics, chemistry, mechanical and other fields of engineering, as well as in medicine, botany and biology. It is only when it comes to political economy that they insist that whether coercion works for us must be tested endlessly.
Why is this such a persistent attitude when it comes to public policy? What could motivate this stubbornness about the feasibility of coercion toward others when other principles, in other areas of concern to us, are widely accepted?
One reason is that many who discuss public policies do not really believe in the possibility of truth in the spheres of morality and politics. These are areas of value and values are, for many people, not subject to demonstration. So, each time a public policy involving coercion is proposed, they aren’t convinced that it is wrong, only that it may not work out.
Of course, what counts as working out is itself a problem. If I rob you of your money in a back alley, did this work? I suppose if I get away with it — no one catches and punishes me for the deed — it worked well enough for me. But what about you? Well, it may actually turn out to have worked for you if, say, you write a short story about the robbery and get it published and henceforth get to be a famous writer. It might turn out this way. Do we now conclude that robbery works? Or do we conclude that this was an exceptional, extraordinary case?
Trouble is those who propose coercive public policies do not claim that their proposal applies only to exceptional cases — for example, natural disasters or the like. They favor coercive policies as a rule, routinely. And they use the rare instances when coercion can have oddly worthwhile results to justify making coercion a general policy (which is a reason to oppose coercion even in those).
In reply to those who champion coercion, then, it simply will not do to show that on this or that occasion the policy does not work. That cuts no ice for the champions of coercion — it might work the next time, you see. Only if it is shown that coercion is generally wrong, that it is a futile practice as a rule, routinely, will there be some hope that it may be excluded as a way to handle social problems.

Friday, October 08, 2004

Thou Protests Too Much
Tibor R. Machan
Back in 1991, quite unbeknownst to me, The Chronicles of Higher Education published an article by the leader of American communitarianism, George Washington University Professor Amitai Etzioni, about his frustrations related to starting out his journal, The Responsive Community. In the course of chronicling the ups and downs of his efforts, he makes mention of the fact that some people were critical of the views communitarians espouse. He proceeds to give an example:
Tibor Machan, professor of philosophy at Auburn University, wrote in an op-ed piece in the Orange County Register that "the mirage of a unified, organic community with its own needs and its own rights is a myth. Let us not be deceived by it and yield even more of our rights to the renewed but essentially worn-out call for subjugation of the individual. In my view, communitarianism is really socialism in a new disguise, with some people wishing to call the shots for the rest of us in line with their own valued objectives."
True enough, I did pen such a piece back then, and I also had an exchange with Etzioni, published in the magazine World & I back in 1995. Moreover, I was invited by Professor Etzioni to contribute a comment even earlier, in 1991, to his budding journal, mainly discussing aspects of libertarianism.
My essay, "Revised Socialism on the Horizon," in World & I, made the point more elaborately I made in The Register column, namely, that communitarianism is a not too subtle restatement of socialist ideals, whereby the community—instead of the society—stands as the primary concern of public policy. Individual rights, once again, can and would often be neglected in favor of what some leaders deem to be the important values of the community.
Etzioni didn’t wish to acknowledge this point, of course. In his earlier essay he wrote, accordingly,
We, of course, do not wish to subjugate anyone. We believe that communities arrive at moral standards by consensus. No coercion is involved. To charge us with subjugation when we say that what we stand for most is community--people treating each other as basically deserving of the same standing--is completely erroneous: it's like accusing a Republican of being a Democrat. Such wrong labeling precludes reasoned debate because critics start from premises that aren't valid.
Fair enough—communitarianism never openly advocate some kind of Draconian totalitarian state. My point was precisely that they wish to smuggle in elitism with a human face, thus the talk of community. (Although, recall that communism is not all that far, etymologically, from communitarianism.) What is notable in nearly everything communitarians say is their persistent, unrelenting use of the pronoun "we" or "the community."
Once, driving someplace with my kids, National Public Radio was featuring a talk by Etzioni at the National Press Club. He went on and on about the communitarian vision and at one point my twelve year old daughter, sitting in the back of our van, yelled out "What does this man mean by ‘we’? Who are the ‘we’ he is talking about?"
And that is exactly the problem with communitarianism—their systematic vagueness about the people they are talking about, as those who would set and enforce rules, makes it all too easy to accept a certain elite as speaking for everyone else. "We" too often tends to disguise both the designated authority and those to be held responsible for having made and enforced a policy. The consensus Etzioni spoke of is a myth since many in the community are left out, ignored by those who pretend to speak for everyone in it.
When one charges another with fostering unstated but dangerous implications, it is not a defense to say, "Oh, but that is not what I meant." Very few of those in whose name the worst tyrannies in the world have been perpetrated ever meant anything terrible to happen. Plato’s Socrates, when he sketched for us the ideal community in The Republic, wouldn’t have wanted centuries of monarchists to justify their despotic rule by reference to his ideas. Nor would even Karl Marx, if we are to believe one of his foremost interpreters, the late Sidney Hook, have supported Stalin’s Soviet Union. But that does not show that their ideas were not, in fact, most readily available to many power seekers because of their imprecisions and ambiguities.
Communitarians clearly de-emphasize individual rights and stress community interests above all. And that is a bad idea and tends strongly to lead to the rule of elites.

Selfishness the Right Way
Tibor R. Machan
The most prestigious of contemporary moral philosophers favor the morality of fairness and impartiality. By this they tend to mean we all ought to think first of everyone’s welfare across the globe as we decide how we are going to conduct ourselves. Although they often implore us to fashion public policies by this standard, in fact they intend this to be something we ought to do in our most private decisions as well.
In his book Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), New York University philosophy professor Peter Unger says, for example, "On pain of living a life that's seriously immoral, a typical well-off person, like you and me, must give away most of her financially valuable assets, and much of her income, directing the funds to lessen efficiently the serious suffering of others."
This is quite a preposterous demand, comparable to the Christian ethics that demands that we imitate Christ as we live our lives. But at least the Christians tend to be willing to allow for our imperfections—Roman Catholics didn’t invent confessions for nothing. What Unger & Co.—and in his ethics Unger is joined by many others, including the famous Princeton University philosopher and animal liberation advocate Peter Singer—want from us is total altruism, living entirely for others.
In fact, however, a sensible ethics advises us not to live for others but for ourselves, which often, of course, includes looking out for number two and three and four—family, friends, and neighbors. But we ought, actually, to make sure we are faring well in life, even thriving. Just go to a shrink and see if his advice is that of the altruists. No way—you are supposed to care for yourself, practice that venerable Greek virtue prudence.
An example is how we deal with the terrible news we read every day at the breakfast table—or wherever one gathers the news, if one still has the time and patience to do so. Any sane person will know that there are horrible things happening to people across to globe that he or she simply needs to ignore. Yes, now and then contributing to a rescue fund or the Red Cross is the decent thing to do—I am not suggesting that it’s sensible to be callous. But it is sensible to turn the page when one reads of the latest earthquake in Iran or famine in Somalia or even the weather carnage in Florida—unless your friends and relatives have been hit, in which case the matter becomes personal.
Our lives and energies simply cannot be spread so thin as to care for all others. If we did, the result would be caring for no one at all. Imagine having to cry whenever anyone anywhere dies. Or toasting the birth of every baby everywhere on the globe. Or sharing the pain of economic downturn for all who experience it, while also cheering on the fate of those who are prospering. Who but some kind of mythical saint can have that kind of wealth of emotional resource to feel along with billions of other people and the capacity to act on any of it at all? No one.
What ethics or morality require is sensible living, which takes one’s own objectives in life as one’s priority, including, of course, the well being people for whom one has taken responsibility—one’s children, especially, and other kin. But this blather about how we must serve everyone everywhere in order to amount to morally decent human beings is just crazy. It doesn’t even consider how destructive of any measure of human self-sufficiency such ethical ideals tend to be, communicating to the world that everyone can just wait for the help from everyone else and need not attend to his or her own needs.
The source of this fairness doctrine is varied but one of them stands out: The way children expect parents to be fair to them, say, around the dinner table. We hear kids always belly aching about things not being fair and that’s because they have the often rightful expectation to be taken care of by their elders. But this is supposed to end once one comes of age and is no longer subject to child care.
In any case, the bottom line is that this rampant and wild altruism peddled by contemporary moral philosophers at some of the most highly regarded departments of philosophy is nonsense. One can only hope students encountering the pitch don’t live a life of endless and utter guilt and have the good sense to think matters through for themselves.

Debating with one’s Shadow
Tibor R. Machan
A shadow is different from you, don’t get me wrong, but there is a strong resemblance in essentials. In the case of George Bush versus John Kerry the two men pretty much believe the same thing about the most important thing, namely about the role of government—it’s only a matter of more rather than a bit less (and even then the difference is more a matter of words than actual or likely policies).
Take the Iraqi war. Kerry helped authorized the action and said Hussein ought to go and even voted to fund it all. Now he says he would have done it differently—mainly by getting Germany and France and some other skeptics to go along—but such a counterfactual is tough to judge. What if France and Germany would have stuck to their guns as they say they will even if Kerry becomes US president? It is not mentioned in these debates that Germany and France had very strong economic ties to Iraq, so why would they take part in an action that severs those ties? Terrorists from that region of the world didn’t bother them a bit, so what reason would they have to join the US, especially if they didn’t even think Hussein deserved UN actions against him?
No, in actual fact, Kerry would have done exactly as Bush did or at least done something close. No big difference there.
How about government involvement in health care? Bush says there’s a huge difference between his and Kerry’s stance, yet Kerry wants a kind of government managed medical service for all except those who don’t mind paying for it twice—with their taxes, first, and then to a private doctor again—while Bush wants simply a slower advance toward socialized medicine, starting with his prescription drugs for all aged folks, never even mind whether for rich or poor. That, too, is being paid out of taxes and enlarges government involvement in American medicine.
So, once again, while details may differ, on the essentials the two aren’t far apart.
OK, Bush is something of a supply-sider when it comes to tax policy, believing with economists like Arthur Laffer that cutting taxes will more likely keep the economy robust while still generating huge amounts from the anticipated wider boom. Kerry thinks, along with his team of economists, like Princeton’s Paul Kruger, that this is nonsense and that cutting taxes is tantamount to reducing the "revenues" of the government.
This, too, is mere dickering in my book. Both of them are still thoroughly convinced of the full authority of government to extort money from us, they just differ on the precise method by which to do it so as to provoke the least protest from us while garnering huge sums to do with as they happen to please. Not a big difference, I say.
OK, Bush wanted to do away with partial birth abortions, Kerry didn’t want the ban. I’ll give you this but do not think it makes much of a difference. Here Congress rules, and the courts, and they have spoken. Neither Bush nor Kerry will be very influential, although I admit the court nominations will probably have a significant impact as far as conservative versus liberal causes are concerned, though they will probably even out as far as libertarian hopes go.
Both, of course, like the Patriot Act, with Kerry claiming to wish to alter a few things, which could just be campaign hokum, nothing more. (Indeed, a lot of what both of these blokes are saying can be dismissed as merely trying to get votes and forecasting no dependable policy direction.)
For my money, I will stay out of this and make my point that way. I am hoping enough folks will go elsewhere—to Nader or, more preferably, to Bandarik—to send a strong message of how these two men simply aren’t articulating a sound, rational vision for the American political order. For they certainly aren’t, not if your standards have anything to do with what this country is supposed to have been established for, namely, to uphold principles of individual rights—unalienable ones, at that.
Indeed, these candidates are like rival candidates for the massive corporate state America has become, arguing about which of them is likely to be a better hands on CEO. I am waiting for the candidate who wants to be a referee, an umpire, only willing to rush into action when our basic rights are being threatened.
I think I may have to wait quite some time!

Distrust of Our Minds Indicts Citizenship
Tibor R. Machan
Many defense attorneys, of numerous more or less notorious defendants across the country, have been arguing for some time now that their clients shouldn't be indicted because they cannot get a fair trial after all the publicity associated with the crime of which they are accused. Such arguments are pretty common now and similar to those that prompt venue changes. Not that long ago, both the Unabomber and the Oklahoma City bombing cases have generated such lines of argument from defense attorneys, as have others where the charge has been terrorism or some other very serious crime. This is also a mantra of people who wish to white wash the likes of Dan Rather and others who commit journalistic malpractice, all based on a kind of post-modernist account of human understanding.
Certainly most of us are appalled at what many defendants are accused of having done. There is no reason to think, however, that this will produce insurmountable prejudice in us about the persons who is accused of the crimes. There should be nothing impossible about prospective jurors entering courtrooms without a predisposition to see the defendant in an unfavorable light. Even when the temptation exists, based on some strong emotion and belief, potential jurors, as a rule, can resist this. They need not give in to such disposition because they can exercise self-discipline. Jurors are human beings capable of self-discipline, of looking at arguments and evidence objectively, even if at times this may be difficult to do.
Nor is political partisanship a necessary obstacle to clear understanding. Objectivity isn’t the same as neutrality, of course, but being partial may be well founded—some of us are partial to the truth, some of us couldn’t care less. Objectivity has to do with a commitment to being accurate, factual, well grounded in sound arguments and so forth. Even those who deride objectivity presume to be objective—at least about that topic!
Yet, in our time there is a very general belief that underlies the claim that people cannot see things clearly, without prejudice. I have in mind the now very widely championed view, advanced by some of the most prestigious thinkers, that human minds are unalterably shaped by history, culture, race, gender, national origin or some combination of these. How we see the world is thus supposed to be determined for us. In fact, we are not credited by many of our social scientists and philosophers with the capacity to understand things objectively.
Some academic commentators even believe that natural scientists are necessarily prejudiced. Certain feminists think that male scientists cannot help but see things differently from female ones, which is why they believe that had there been more female scientists, historians and philosophers, the very understanding of reality would now be different. Others believe that our understanding is controlled by the small or large communities to which we owe loyalty. It is our solidarity with a specific community that determines what we think and objective knowledge is a myth. Many sociologists and social psychologists agree, arguing that even the words we use are invented to suit our social needs and do not really manage to serve to represent the world as it actually is.
What is very odd about all these relativist views that so many people embrace is that they completely invalidate, in their own terms, all of what their proponents believe. If their ideas were true, then, of course, their own claims could not be taken seriously -- they would have to amount to nothing more serious than some group's or race's or gender's "truth," not likely to be relevant to others who would, then have, their own "truths." Indeed, words themselves would lack any reliable, dependable meaning and none of the points these folks want to communicated could be communicated successfully. The denial that we can be objective fatally undermines itself.
Partly in light of these very same ideas, some people think that what theorists, among them philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and other academicians, advocate is really irrelevant to the way the real world works. But this is wrong. The scribbling of these folks leaves a mark. One of the marks that we see around us from what academicians have written and taught in their class rooms is that even journalists and others outside the academy often claim that the human mind cannot really think clearly about anything, that we are all irreparably biased.
Certainly this is having its impact on the way members of juries are regarded in our day. It also can have an influence on how some people think about journalism and, indeed, democracy itself, a system that ultimately trusts people to be able to think clearly and independently about crucial political matters -- e.g., who should represent us in government, who has done a creditable job of this, what measures deserve our support and so forth.
When such distrusts starts to spread, look out. We will then hear the call for the rule of experts, a dream that was most clearly articulated by the late Harvard psychologist B. F. Skinner in his 1971 book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. He was at least forthright about it: the country needs to be run by those Skinner called "technologists of behavior," men and women well versed in the behavior modification method Skinner himself helped to develop, the only ones who can be trusted to be objective, impartial, unbiased.
When proposed so directly, people tend to recoil from the idea that they are basically inept, unqualified to deal with political matters. However, at the hands of other academics the attack on the human capacity to think clearly and objectively is more circumspect and as such it can sneak up on an unsuspecting public.
For example we are told by some social scientists that people's economic or cultural background unalterably tilts how they see the world. Folks from one region of the world, with certain kinds of traditions, living in certain economic conditions, just understand things in certain ways, like it or not. Independent understanding is impossible for them. Marvin Kitman, a columnist for Newsday, says: "There can be no such thing as objectivity. ‘Of all journalistic pretensions, that is the most hypocritical,’ explained Geraldo Rivera in a brilliant lecture at the Edinburgh Festival in 2002, largely ignored by the objective media. ‘To suggest that alone among the human race we reporters have the unique ability to divorce from emotion with machinelike efficiency, cull not only the truth from fiction, but also fact from perception or opinion, is baloney. We all try to get the facts right. But all of us see things differently, whether it is because you're standing over there and I'm over here, or personal experiences. We could look at the same event, both of us believing that we are being 100 percent professional and factual and call the story differently.’" Kitman goes on to claim that it is the lack of our capacity for objectivity that makes the free press so precious. "It's time we grew up and accepted the fact that all news is biased; only some is more biased than other. You take your pick. That is the great thing about freedom of the press."
This stance, apart from sounding like a lame effort to bail out Dan Rather and CBS-TV news, is a very serious threat against political liberty, something that may well turn out to be the worst impact of the teaching of the theorists in contemporary academe. It is also a colossal cop out. It is also what has given support to many of the worst dictatorships and one party system of politics, since when you and I are denied the capacity to be able to know things for what they are, it is easier to sell us on the idea that we require a select few, who have learned to escape our bonds, to run things for us.
The possibility for objectivity, while not guaranteeing that we will always get things right, is a bulwark against those who would deny our rights and proceed to rule the rest of us properly, as they believe only they can. Never mind that the view that we are incapable of getting things right makes such a belief itself incredible—why would it be free of bias and if it isn’t why bother taking it seriously? But if we buy their story, we will undermine our ability to see this for ourselves and such folks will have managed to hoodwink us despite the paradoxical views they champion. (For more on this, see Tibor R. Machan, Objectivity: Recovering Determinate Reality in Philosophy, Science, and Everyday Life [UK: Ashgate, 2004].)


Friday, March 26, 2004

The Great Divorce, Part 2
By Roderick Long

In The Great Divorce, Part 1, I criticised Tibor Machan’s position that the difference between minarchism and Market Anarchism is “only apparent.”

Dr. Machan has now posted two replies: Some Initial Replies to Dr. Long’s Critique of “Anarchism and Minarchism: A Rapprochement” and ‘Government’ vs. ‘State’. In what follows I quote excerpts from Dr. Machan’s posts along with my replies:
This is confusing: “he would be justified in using coercive measures to eject these trespassers...” What it should say is that “he would be justified in using forcible measures to eject these trespassers....” Coercion is by definition the use of force that violates rights, especially within the framework of libertarianism. Force, on the other hand, may or may not.

Along similar lines, then, “justified coercion” is an oxymoron – it means “justified initiated force against another.”
Not in my dictionary (or any dictionary I’ve ever looked at). The word “coercion” means any kind of force or compulsion, whether initiatory or not. The word for initiatory force is “aggression” or “invasion,” not “coercion.”
Dr. Long says, “In other words, the idea seems to be that competing protection agencies are likely to violate rights in the course of offering their protection, and so government is justified in prohibiting them.” That is wrong; he is jumping to conclusions I did not endorse, that government may ban other governments. My point is that a bunch of us have good, ethical reasons for instituting government qua due-process-observing-agency. There is no mention here about banning anything, none at all.

Since however such an agency must have geographical contiguity – which is the nature-based option – so as not to generate routine (though at times in human history temporarily and luckily avoidable) problems of border crossing, such a government as one bunch shall institute will naturally – not only as a matter of consumer preference – involve a sort of monopoly within a given area. But those not liking it can always go next door, just as those who don't like the services offered by, say, the local electrical company can move to the one serving the other neighborhood. (The big difference is that electrical companies do not go around rounding up people called criminals!)
I take it, then, that Dr. Machan’s position is this: the agency he calls “government” should not prohibit competition, but it will not need to; because government is a natural monopoly, no competitors – except in a few unusual situations – will in fact be able to compete with it for long (within the same geographical territory).

Obviously I disagree with Dr. Machan’s judgment that government is a natural monopoly. But so long as he does not favour the actual prohibition of competitors, our disagreement is about matters of fact, not about ethics or rights. (For whether we still disagree about rights also, see later below.)

On the subject of “matters of fact,” however, I must point out how pessimistic Dr. Machan’s conclusion is. The fact that a monopoly is natural rather than coercive doesn’t exempt it from the informational and incentival problems that the coercive sorts of monopolies face. If government really is a natural monopoly as Dr. Machan argues, then it follows that the provision of legal services is doomed to be more inefficient and abusive than other types of service. In short, Dr. Machan’s position implies that in the field of law, market failure is inevitable. I think both theoretical and historical considerations show otherwise.

To my historical evidence Dr. Machan replies as follows:
Dr. Long writes: “But of course we know historically that the answer to that question [whether legal jurisdictions can overlap] is yes. Surely the existence, and therefore a fortiori the possibility, of competing jurisdictions within the same territory is an established historical fact. (See Tom Bell’s bibliographic essay Polycentric Law, as well as the various links on the Molinari Institute’s anarchist resources page.)”

This I take to be the kind of argument that states, “Look here and there in the world criminals turn around and confess their crimes and turn themselves in, so there really is no need for arresting officers in the criminal law system.” One swallow – or even a few them – do not a springtime make, to quote a favorite philosopher of both of us!

In other words, some cases of maintaining, administering and protecting law exist that are dispersed over a crisscross region. I call this good fortune – the result of unusually cooperative people who do not have the misfortune of a lot of resistance to the operations of the law. But in most cases this would be unlikely, given the vast difference between people from different religions, cultures, philosophical orientations. That such a smooth operation existed in ancient Ireland and a few other places does not demonstrate that that is what most places would enjoy. Much more reasonable is it to assume that there will be ample recalcitrance and so homogeneity is a more efficient approach to uphold the law than the crisscross alternative.
I suspect few readers of the sagas would be inclined to describe the inhabitants of medieval Ireland or Iceland as “unusually cooperative people”; on the contrary, they seem an unusually ornery and contentious people whose combative instincts were gradually tamed and disciplined by semi-anarchistic institutions.

But in any case overlapping jurisdictions have succeeded in much larger and more heterogeneous cultures than ancient Ireland and Iceland. The medieval system of competing royal, manorial, ecclesiastical, and merchant courts united all of western Europe. Moreover, the tu quoque argument applies: if the relative scarcity of successful anarchies counts against anarchy, why doesn’t the relative scarcity of successful minarchies count against minarchy?
It is interesting that when Roy A. Childs, Jr., witnessed the debacle of competing governments within the same territory in Afghanistan, he gave up his Rothbardian beliefs. I believe he saw the practical, routine, results of competing legal orders within the same territory.
Here again I invoke tu quoque: if Afghanistan counts as an argument against anarchy, why doesn’t Nazi Germany count as an argument against government? Ayn Rand once write that “the root of all philosophical errors” is “to substitute for an abstraction one of the concrete applications of that abstraction, and at the same time make that concrete contradict and invalidate the abstraction.” (Journals of Ayn Rand, p. 640.) Discrediting the abstraction anarchy by equating it with its undesirable instance Afghanistan is no more legitimate than discrediting the abstraction government by equating it with its undesirable instance Nazi Germany.

Why do critics of anarchism make this mistake so often? I think it’s because while they recognise that governments can have different sorts of political structures, with very different outcomes, they think of all anarchies as being alike in having no structure – and so one unsuccessful anarchy refutes all anarchies. The misconception of anarchy as lacking political structure is one I’ve tried to rebut in my critique of Bidinotto, where I argue that anarchy is actually a constitutional system of checks and balances taken to its logical conclusion.
At the end of his comment Dr. Long puts the following questions to me:
· What is your precise definition of “state”?
· What is your precise definition of “government”?
· Do you think the competitive provision of legal services wihin a single territory is impossible?
· or possible but unjust?
· or possible and just but otherwise undesirable?
· Do you think [your] ideal minarchic government should or should not attempt to ban any attempt to compete with it (within the same territory)?
Here are my answers:

Since I do not use the term “state” (and if I ever did in the distant past I meant by it no more than “government”), and since the form of government I consider justified is non-coercive although possibly a natural monopoly by natural (but not logical) necessity, I do not want to respond to this request. Perhaps Dr. Long ought to ask a Marxist and Hegelian, not a libertarian.
I find this response odd, for two reasons. First, if Dr. Machan doesn’t say what he means by “state,” on what grounds can he object to having his favoured form of government called one? Second, I don’t see anything especially Hegelian or Marxist about the term “state”; the term is widely used by writers of all political persuasions, including libertarians (of both the anarchist and the minarchist variety). In political theory, the closest thing to a canonical definition of “state” is Max Weber’s, and that definition is hardly Marxist or Hegelian.
Government is the institution in human communities that administers, maintains and protects the legal order. A just government does all this without any coercion (use of rights-violating force). (Like marriage or medicine, the concept of government does not preclude malpractice – in this case, unjust operations. Neither does it require that all governments be unjust.)
This definition is ambiguous. Does the phrase “the institution” have to mean a single agency, or could it apply equally to a plurality of agencies?
I think that, as a rule, competitive provision of legal services within a single territory is impossible on a long term basis, with some exceptions due to very similar people involved in both the provision and the demand for those services. As noted, just because here and there such a system can function, it doesn’t follow that it is a generally functional system. Mostly, when powerful disagreements reign between the citizens of different providers (governments), then crisscrossing services will be unstable, although not for every single instance of adjudication.
This is true as far as it goes – but it’s a mistake to think of these disagreements as purely exogenous. We both shape our institutions and are shaped by them. Since neighbouring territories, under conditions of free trade and free migration, are likely to undergo considerable cultural assimilation to one another, these “powerful disagreements” are likely to decrease over time. In any case, I maintain that such political disagreements as do exist are far more intractable under a monopoly than under a competitive system, because under the latter system customers must themselves foot the bill for their favoured laws.
No one should attempt to ban any peaceful activity. However, where borders have been voluntarily established, and contracts (constitutions) establish the relationship between provider and recipient, entry past those borders would amount to invasion from outside. Jurisdictional regions may not be intruded upon by those with whom no contract for services are in force.
Here I begin to worry. On libertarian principles as I understand them (see here and here), service contracts may legitimately be enforced only via money damages and not specific performance. Hence the customers of Dr. Machan’s monopoly agency must be free to discontinue their relationship with that agency without relocating to a different territory. (If they are not so free, then Dr. Machan’s monopoly is a coercive one after all.) They may have to pay a fee for early termination of service, but they cannot be held as customers against their will. But if they are free to change service, then a rival service provider may legitimately step in as soon as its services are requested. Hence these “borders” are not and cannot be analogous to the borders of a coercively monopolistic state, which can be changed only with the state’s permission. The only case where the borders could not be altered at the decision of the customer would be in a proprietary community where the provider of legal services is also the owner (or under contract to the owner) of the community’s entire territory; this approach, while consistent with libertarian principles, has certain drawbacks which I’ve discussed previously.

It is this passage that makes me unsure whether Dr. Machan and I are disagreeing merely about a matter of fact (i.e., what the results of free entry in the market for legal services would likely be) or also about rights. If he holds that his monopoly agency would be justified on contractual grounds in forbidding its customers to switch service providers without leaving the territory, then we do disagree about rights; in that case I would call his favoured agency a “government,” and I would call any community possessing such an agency a “state.” Otherwise not.
Within libertarianism ... the concept “government” is still unstable. Anarcho-libertarians, who argue for something they dub “competing legal systems” “or competing defense organizations,” claim that the concept “government” means, essentially, “a monopoly of legal services over a given territory.” This isn’t as clear cut as one might wish. Are they talking about legally protected monopolies or monopolies plain and simple, which could mean very competitive organizations, indeed – for example, a department store sitting on a large piece of private property that has no competitor right then and there but is amply competed with by stores in the nearby vicinity? Yet where it stands, it’s a monopoly, in a sense. Or an apartment house – it too stands alone and to rent a competitor’s dwellings, one needs to move.
Dr. Machan writes as though the department store and the apartment house are “monopolies plain and simple” rather than “legally protected monopolies.” This puzzles me. The reason that these cases are territorial monopolies is that they are private property. The absence of competitors is neither a consumer choice nor a fact of nature; rather, competitors are kept out by force of law, and rightly so. This is a case of justified coercion (by which I mean force per se, not necessarily initiatory force).

I don’t think it’s mysterious what most libertarians mean by “government.” They mean a territorial monopoly maintained by force. The difference between anarchists and minarchists is that minarchists think this is one of the justified uses of force while anarchists do not. As I noted in my original post, although not all libertarians use the term this way, government is understood as compulsorily monopolistic by an overwhelming majority of both anarchists and minarchists.
There are libertarians called minarchists, with whom I am usually linked – along with Ayn Rand, John Hospers, the late Robert Nozick and during the last few years of his life, Roy A. Childs, Jr. (although he also penned a famous piece, “The Contradiction in Objectivism,” back in 1968, for Rampart Journal, in which he announced his dissent from Rand’s minarchist position). I disagree that governments may not compete and may coerce anyone. To be fair, neither did Ayn Rand agree that governments may coerce anyone – she, for example, denied that taxation is permissible while also claiming government is, thus disowning the characterization of government by perhaps the most famous anarcho-libertarian, Murray N. Rothbard.
It’s true that Rand’s ideal government lacks the power to tax. But I don’t think it’s true that Rand’s ideal government is non-coercive; I don’t see any way to read her essay “The Nature of Government” except as calling for a prohibition of competitors in legal services.

It is also true that Rothbard includes both coercive territorial monopoly and taxing power in his definition of government. My own definition would include the first but not the second. I don’t think Rothbard’s definition is as question-begging as it looks, however, for the second condition is a plausible inference from the first. Any agency possessing a coercive territorial monopoly is going to have a very strong incentive to engage in taxation; and the monopoly profits it reaps by prohibiting competitors already differ little in principle from taxes.
But as Gallie’s point makes clear, this debate as to what is the most sensible, reasonable definition of “government” is likely to continue for a long time, if not indefinitely. In my own view, for example, the institutions anarcho-libertarians support are governments in every important respect – they are administrators, maintainers, and protectors of bona fide law within human communities. What critics claim is that such administration, maintenance and protection do not require contiguous spheres of jurisdiction but could work as a sort of crisscross system.

From a few historical cases, in which such a system had been in place – in ancient Iceland, for example – these disputants conclude that as a general rule governments could operate quite happily, smoothly, with no judicial failures – such as inability to arrest prosecute criminals or to render effective service when citizens (or clients) seek police protection – serving crisscross localities. OK, so this is an interesting debate and worthy of pursuit. Either way we could get to government, however.
If we mean by “government” what Dr. Machan means by it, yes. But I think his use of that term is far more idiosyncratic than he realises.
My one beef with many who reject this idea is that they refuse to admit that “government” need not involve coercion at all. They could just as easily dispute that the crisscross system involves law, properly understood, only, perhaps, various rules or edicts or policies. And even more problematic is their all too frequent use of the concept “state” as a substitute for government.

For example, in a recent letter to Liberty magazine, Professor Roderick Long of Auburn University sets out to take issue with Bruce Ramsey’s claim that Hernando “de Soto’s work ... shows that a healthy economy crucially depends on property titles, identity records, and other institutions of formal law” and is thus “a standing refutation of libertarian anarchism.”

As Long proceeds in his letter, however, an interesting switch takes place. He contends that “as the research of scholars like Bruce Benson, Tom Bell, and others has shown, history is filled with examples of legal systems that were perfectly formal – complete with official procedures, court records, and the rest – and yet private, competitive, and non-governmental.” He states that “in late medieval Europe ... the commercial law known as the Law Merchant outcompeted the government legal system ....” And then, from this, he jumps to the following conclusion: “Hence the state is not necessary for formal law.”

I don’t know about Bruce Ramsey, but I certainly would not conclude from de Soto’s work that the state is necessary for anything, although I would agree that governments may well be. Because what Long and all those other scholars show, as far as I am able to discern, is that in medieval Europe there were different kinds of governments, some of them coercive and others not.
In my response to Bruce Ramsey I used “state” and “government” interchangeably because that is what Ramsey did in his original letter. According to Ramsey, chaos ensues when “the state absents itself.” He is clearly using “state” as the name for a kind of institution he favours – as do most minarchists. Robert Nozick, after all, defended the “minimal state.” Charles Dunoyer and Frédéric Bastiat used the term “état” for the libertarian political order they advocated. Ayn Rand spoke interchangeably of “the government – the state” and described capitalism as “a limitation on the power of the state.” Ludwig von Mises and Leonard Peikoff both use “state” and “government” interchangeably (and both incidentally describe their favoured agency as holding a monopoly of coercion). While there are exceptions, it is simply a fact that most minarchists would happily describe themselves as favouring the existence of a state (as did I, during my twelve years as a minarchist).
OK, so what’s wrong with this conclusion? I assume critics would now claim that I am twisting the concept “government” to suit my goals, namely, to defend governments as quite possibly a just institution administering, maintaining and protecting bona fide law. I dispute this – I claim that they are wrongly claiming that governments must be unjust and so the concept ought to be abandoned by all right thinking folks. But one way they support this is by equivocating between “government” and “state.”

It is well known that the concept “state,” especially as it figured in the writings of Hegel and Marx, is not the same as “government.” It is, instead, the entire organized community, akin to what Aristotle meant by “polis.” The state does, then, call to mind, quite sensibly, a fully coercive leviathan, a pyramid-shaped, top down system of coercive regimentation of nearly all facets of human community life (apart from those deemed not essential, although even those would be subject to regimentation if the agents of the state so chose).
I don’t think it can possibly be “well known” that state and government differ, since, as we’ve seen, most libertarians – be they minarchists or anarchists – do use the terms equivalently. And so, for the most part, do non-libertarian political therists, particularly in response to Weber’s influence. When the concepts do differ, the difference is fairly slight: government means an institution possessing a coercive territorial monopoly of force, and state means a society governed by such an institution. Most people certainly do not use the terms “state” and “totalitarian state” interchangeably.
Now I am not going to resolve any of the main disputes here but I wish to make just one little final point. To equivocate between “government” and “state” is wrong and even dirty pool. It would be similar dirty pool if those critical of anarcho-libertarians referred to what the latter advocate as “chaos,” recalling not the arguably esoteric conception of anarchy individualist and libertarian anarchists have been developing but the position of those old fashioned, classical anarchists who meant by the term “lawless society.”
If most anarchists called themselves proponents of chaos, it would not be unfair for their critics to call them proponents of chaos too. But most minarchists do call themselves proponents of a state; hence I see nothing unfair about calling minarchists proponents of a state. The use of “state” and “government” as equivalent or near-equivalent terms is not a clever rhetorical device the anarchists cooked up; it is common usage among nearly all parties to this debate. (As for the “old fashioned, classical anarchists,” I don’t think it’s fair to describe most of them as advocates of a “lawless society.” Who does Dr. Machan have in mind?)
Of course, when emotions run high – as they tend to be in discussions among people who are nearly in full agreement and know that they are more likely to be able to land a blow at those in close range than at those who don’t even pay attention to their views – it’s tempting to engage in hyperbole.

Labeling an allegedly “near pure” libertarian opponent a “supporter of the state” or “a statist” does carry a painful sting. One would hope, however, that just this temptation is resisted by serious scholars.
I would not ordinarily call minarchists “statists.” But I would certainly call them “advocates of a state,” because that is what nearly all of them call themselves – and given what nearly everybody means by “state,” that is indeed what they are.
PS: After I have penned the above and informed Dr. Rod Long that I did, he proceeded to pen yet another missive on his blog using the term “state” instead of “government” to characterize what folks such as I support. So, just to be very clear, I do not champion any kind of state whatever but I believe a non-coercive, limited government in the Lockean classical liberal tradition is a good idea.
The post Dr. Machan is referring to was simply my original response to Bruce Ramsey. This was not something new I “penned,” since I had written it months earlier; I posted it as soon as it appeared in Liberty. In that letter I used the term “state” to characterise, not what Dr. Machan supports (for reasons explained above, I remain unsure what exactly he supports), but what Bruce Ramsey supports. And I was surely justified in doing so, because, as I’ve mentioned, Ramsey uses the term “state” himself.

I’m worried at Dr. Machan’s closing remark that he favours a “limited government in the Lockean classical liberal tradition.” That tradition has for the most part favoured an agency that forbids competitors. Locke in particular argues for irrevocable, no-exit contracts of submission to political society. This leaves me wondering once again exactly what sorts of contractual relationships Dr. Machan favours between his “government” and its customers/citizens.

Finally, several readers have asked me why I titled my reply to Dr. Machan “The Great Divorce.” I was thinking of C. S. Lewis’ book The Great Divorce, and particularly of its opening paragraphs.


Machan’s Reply:
I have only a little more time and a few more words to devote to this topic for now. Here it goes.
In your new blog you uses this language: "their favored agency as holding a monopoly of coercion," and also this language: "government means an institution possessing a coercive territorial monopoly of force." An agency that has a monopoly of coercion--or, in my terminology, of force--need not have a coercive monopoly of coercion (or force)--the monopoly may be natural, not coercive. So it is different from the way your second use describes government, "an institution possessing a coercive territorial monopoly." I hold to the former but not the latter characterization of the libertarian conception of government. Whether the crisscross or the homogeneous variety is the best sort is important but that's not about whether libertarianism can embrace government and also fully, consistently reject the use of coercive force (e.g., for banning competition). Government may be involved in disallowing the breach of freely assumed, consensual, constitutional obligations but this is so also with the legal service institutions anarchist libertarians prefer when they forcibly arrest someone who refuses to heed their legally backed edicts--these would fall under the category of "defensive or retaliatory uses of force" as would the disallowing the breach of freely assumed, consensual, constitutional obligations. (Does arresting someone impose specific performance on them? I would think so--they have no option to bolt and just pay up!)
In my view it is best to avoid using "state" to speak of governments within the libertarian framework, however much others may not hold to this idea. I also think that defense agencies, justice agencies, or, to use Block's term, defense-insurance agencies are, by all reasonable assessment, governments of a certain type, namely, limited governments (limited to using defensive and retaliatory force only). Classical liberals such as Locke may have failed to work it out fully that governments may not coercively prohibit emigration, just as you claim, but here we witness perhaps a case of philosophical advance, so that modern libertarians have realized that the use of coercive force is categorically wrong and not even governments may deploy it. (In my view the hint in the liberal tradition of law that this was pretty much anticipated is the importance of due process, namely, governmental conduct that eschews all rights violations.)
Finally, I am not sure what all hinges on dissing the use of "government" when there are so many different types of governments (or even states) in the history of political philosophy and theory. Why is it necessary to insist that "government" must be something unjust, something that necessarily violates individual rights, when we have qualifiers to alert folks that we are talking about governments limited in certain specific ways, in the case of libertarians, limited to using only defensive and retaliatory force? I think it is perfectly evident to most people who think about these issues that when it is a libertarian legal authority--call it government, call it defense-insurance agency, call it whatever--it may not get involved in rights violation, period. So the dispute on whether government can be libertarian or not is, I think, largely moot. But perhaps I missing some of the issues that guide your and other anarcho-libertarians' thinking here. I really think the difference is about the crisscross versus homogeneous jurisdiction, not about anything else.